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BIRCH BAYH AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT: LESSONS IN LEADERSHIP
Joel K. Goldstein*
INTRODUCTION
Historians debate whether great people make history or whether certain
circumstances present the occasions which allow great figures to emerge. In
fact, the truth includes elements of both. Significant, positive change
depends on—but is not made inevitable by—historical context alone. Great
accomplishments do not just happen. History’s great, positive developments
most often occur when talent and circumstance intersect—when a person of
vision, skill, and will seizes an opportunity presented by the times to propel
the future in a more positive direction. Reform depends on wise and effective
leadership—people who have the understanding and vision to imagine a
better way and the skill, credibility, and fortitude to make it happen.
These thoughts belong to a discussion of Senator Birch Bayh and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.1 Formal constitutional amendments in the
American system are extraordinary events, made so by the challenges of
meeting the degree of consensus that the multiple, high, supermajority
hurdles impose.2 Only twenty-seven formal amendments have revised the
U.S. Constitution in 231 years but even that ratio of one amendment every
8.5 years overstates their frequency since ten amendments came in the first
two years of our government and the first twelve within the first fifteen
years.3 In other words, there have been only fifteen amendments during the
last 216 years, one every 14.4 years. No amendment has been both proposed
* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law. I was
honored to offer brief comments regarding the role of Senator Birch Bayh in the passage of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution during a Symposium entitled
Celebrating the Impact of Senator Birch Bayh: A Lasting Legacy on the Constitution and
Beyond hosted by Fordham Law School’s Feerick Center for Social Justice on October 16,
2019, at Fordham University School of Law. This Essay is an elaborated and much-expanded
discussion of some of the thoughts I briefly expressed on that occasion. I am grateful to John
D. Feerick and John Rogan for including me in this program and allowing me to pay tribute
to such a consequential public servant as Senator Birch Bayh. For an overview of the
corresponding Tribute, see Foreword: Celebrating the Impact of Senator Birch Bayh: A
Lasting Legacy on the Constitution and Beyond, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2020).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that a constitutional amendment must be proposed
by two-thirds of both chambers of Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states).
3. See America’s Founding Documents: The Constitution: Amendments 11–27, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27 [https://perma.cc/
7JJF-UEYY] (last visited June 22, 2020) [hereinafter America’s Founding Documents].
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and ratified in almost fifty years since 1971 when Congress proposed, and
the states ratified, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, extending the vote to
citizens eighteen years of age and older.4 Birch Bayh had something to do
with that contribution to democratic governance too,5 but his work on that
constitutional amendment is not the topic of this Essay—the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment is.
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided a means to fill a vice presidential
vacancy before awaiting the next scheduled presidential election and created
procedures to transfer presidential powers and duties from a disabled
president to the vice president.6 Under Bayh’s leadership, Congress
proposed it in July 1965, and three-fourths of the states ratified it just
nineteen months later in February 1967.7
In constitutional analysis, as in life, there is a tendency to take for granted
the things that have been long in place; to view them as inevitable; to forget
or ignore the difficult paths that led to their creation; to underestimate the
barriers overcome, the skill required, and the magnitude of the
accomplishments. That is certainly true of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. It
was a highly constructive change, which responded to constitutional defects
that dated from the 1787 convention in Philadelphia. Although subsequent
events made those defects even more troubling, they had resisted correction.
It has often been noted that the amendment would not have occurred but
for the three presidential periods of incapacity of President Dwight D.
Eisenhower in the mid-1950s8 and the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy on November 22, 1963.9 Those events occurred during the atomic
age and Cold War, circumstances which exponentially increased the
importance of presidential continuity and lent urgency to a response.
Those events and circumstances certainly formed an important part of the
historical context of the mid-1960s, but they did not make the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment inevitable. Eisenhower’s last incapacity occurred in November
1957,10 yet he left office without either chamber of Congress having
proposed a solution, a step that did not occur for nearly another seven years,
in late September 1964, when the Senate unanimously approved Bayh’s
proposed resolution.11 The following year both chambers of Congress
approved different versions of Bayh’s amendment and, after a difficult
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which was ratified in
1992, was actually proposed in 1789. See America’s Founding Documents, supra note 3.
5. Jesse Wegman, The Man Who Changed the Constitution, Twice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/opinion/birch-bayh-constitution.html [https://
perma.cc/Q2EE-GF4Z] (noting Senator Bayh’s role in drafting both the Twenty-Sixth and
Twenty-Fifth amendments).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 2–4.
7. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 104–05 (3d ed. 2014).
8. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions
to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2017).
9. See id. at 1144.
10. See infra Part I.
11. 110 CONG. REC. 23,002, 23,061 (1964).
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conference that finally reconciled the variations, Congress accepted the
product and submitted the proposal to the states.12 Kennedy’s assassination
was a national trauma that elevated the issue of presidential continuity in the
public’s consciousness, yet even that haunting event did not make action
inexorable. Congressmen and others advocated multiple inconsistent
proposals to deal with presidential succession, vice presidential vacancy, and
presidential inability.13 Basic differences over design and details threatened
to prevent progress. Legislators had little inclination to invest the huge
amount of time and energy to secure a constitutional amendment regarding a
topic that offered no political payoff. At various junctures, views diverged,
objections arose, and obstacles surfaced that made progress doubtful. Earlier
crises relating to presidential continuity had not produced resolution. There
was no reason to be optimistic this time either.
What was different this time was Birch Bayh. The amendment simply
would not have happened without his wise, inspired, persistent, and effective
political leadership. He was the missing ingredient, the indispensable actor,
the change agent that made the amendment happen. And so, it is worth
unpacking that story, not only to recognize a great public servant, indeed a
constitutional architect, but to extract, be instructed, and perhaps inspired by
the lessons the story offers about political leadership. This Essay will begin
by providing a brief historical overview of the problems relating to
presidential succession, vice presidential vacancy, and presidential inability
before outlining the steps Bayh took that culminated in Congress proposing
to the states what became the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. It will then distill
from that summary some of the leadership qualities Bayh displayed that were
essential to the adoption and implementation of the amendment.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Constitution, as written in Philadelphia in 1787 and ratified by the
states, provided that in case of presidential death, resignation, removal, or
inability to perform the powers and duties of the office, “the same” devolved
on the vice president.14 It further authorized Congress to designate some
officer to act as president if some combination of those four contingencies
prevented both the president and vice president from executing the office.15
The Constitution did not define presidential inability nor did it provide any
procedures for determining an inability or transferring presidential powers
and duties when one occurred.16 Although overwhelming evidence suggests
12. FEERICK, supra note 7, at 79–104.
13. See infra Part II.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office,
or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President . . . .”).
15. Id. (“[A]nd the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected.”).
16. FEERICK, supra note 7, at 3.
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that the constitutional framers intended that the vice president would simply
act as, not become, president when any of the four contingencies occurred
and that the president could resume those powers and duties when the
inability ended,17 a quite different practice developed beginning in 1841 after
President William Henry Harrison became the first president to die in
office.18 His vice president, John Tyler, claimed that he had become
president and was not simply discharging presidential authorities as vice
president.19 Tyler’s position was accepted and followed by other vice
presidents upon the deaths of the presidents under whom they served.20 Since
the Constitution assigned the vice president the same status when any of the
four contingencies affected the president, the Tyler precedent raised the
possibility that a presidential inability might elevate the vice president to the
first office, thereby displacing the original chief executive forever, even if he
recovered.21 That scenario gave vice presidents and others pause about
declaring a president disabled. The constitutional gaps, especially the
absence of procedures and the uncertainty regarding whether the president
would be displaced, contributed to the inaction when President James
Garfield was disabled for eighty days between the time of his shooting and
his death in 1881 and when President Woodrow Wilson was incapacitated
for a substantial portion of the last seventeen months of his term due to a
stroke and other ailments.22 The three Eisenhower illnesses—a serious heart
attack in September 1955, ileitis surgery in June 1956, and a stroke in
November 195723—were the first events of their kind during the Cold War
and nuclear age, events that made some solution urgent.24
Yet when Birch Bayh first entered the U.S. Senate in January 1963,25 more
than five years after the last of these events, Congress had reached no
consensus. Indeed, its failure to make tangible progress had prompted
President Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon to commit to an
informal letter agreement regarding presidential inability.26 It allowed
Eisenhower or, if he was unable to do so, Nixon to determine that Eisenhower
was disabled and thereby transfer presidential power temporarily to Nixon,
with the understanding that Eisenhower could reclaim presidential powers
and duties unilaterally.27 John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson made
essentially the same arrangement in August 1961.28 This approach provided
17. See Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation: Some Lessons from
the Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. L. REV. 647, 668–71 (2016).
18. Id. at 671–72.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 673.
21. Id. at 674–75.
22. Id. at 675–76.
23. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1141 n.24.
24. Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (2010).
25. See BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND
SUCCESSION 1 (1968).
26. Goldstein, supra note 17, at 676–77. See generally FEERICK, supra note 7, at 53–54.
27. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 964–65.
28. Id.
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a stopgap, but it was an imperfect remedy. It was not legally binding, it did
not address the situation where a president was disabled but unwilling to so
recognize, and it would have allowed the president to resume powers even if
his disability continued.29
The Kennedy assassination raised a second vexing problem. For the
sixteenth time in American history, the vice presidency was vacant.30
Congress had placed the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
President pro tempore of the Senate next in the line of presidential succession
in 1947,31 but this legislative line presented some problems. The occupants
of those positions, John McCormack and Carl Hayden respectively, had not
been considered “presidential timber”32 and now stood behind a president
who had himself suffered a serious heart attack in July 1955, a few months
The picture of the aged-looking
before Eisenhower’s coronary.33
McCormack and Hayden behind Johnson when the new president gave a
televised address to Congress a few days after Kennedy’s assassination went
viral (to the extent an image could in 1963) and created unease.34 Moreover,
Nixon and Johnson’s service elevated the vice presidency.35 The office was
widely viewed not only as the best solution to presidential succession but
also as an office that could help the president.36 Although McCormack and
Hayden belonged to President Johnson’s party, legislative leaders may come
from the opposite party.37 And some simply thought legislative succession
was unconstitutional.38
II. THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF BIRCH
BAYH IN ACTION
Roughly three years after graduating from law school in 1960 and during
his first year in the U.S. Senate, Birch Bayh, then age thirty-five and the
second-youngest member of the upper chamber, became chairman of the

29. See, e.g., Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amends. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 43 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of
Professor James Kirby, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University).
30. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 258 (1965).
31. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19).
32. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 965.
33. Id.
34. Interview, A Modern Father of Our Constitution: An Interview with Former Senator
Birch Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 789 (2011).
35. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO
SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TO BIDEN 25–26 (2016); see also FEERICK, supra note 30, at 212–13,
231–32.
36. See generally FEERICK, supra note 30, at 211–33.
37. Id. at 264, 267; Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1027–29.
38. See FEERICK, supra note 30, at 267–69 (summarizing legal arguments against a
legislative line of succession).
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Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.39 Then, as at the time
of Kennedy’s assassination several months later, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary had before it Senate Joint Resolution 35 (“S.J. Res. 35”), a
proposed constitutional amendment providing simply that a disabled
president could temporarily transfer power to the vice president and that
Congress could otherwise legislate on the subject.40 S.J. Res. 35 was the
product of Senator Estes Kefauver, Bayh’s predecessor as the subcommittee
chair, who had died in August 1963, and the ranking minority member,
Senator Kenneth Keating of New York.41 It also had the support of some
important senators as well as the influential American Bar Association
(ABA) and Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach.42
Shortly after the Kennedy assassination made presidential continuity a
pressing issue, Bayh studied the topic and concluded that a constitutional
amendment was needed to address the problem but that S.J. Res. 35 was
substantively and politically flawed.43 By giving Congress a blank
legislative check,44 it failed to provide constitutional constraints to prevent a
hostile Congress from pretextually using presidential inability to undermine
appropriate presidential powers. It also did not provide a means to fill a vice
presidential vacancy, a remedy Bayh thought essential given the
development of the second office and the problems inherent with other
potential successors to the presidency.45 Bayh found S.J. Res. 35 politically
misguided because it deferred the most difficult problem regarding
presidential inability: how to handle a situation where an incapacitated
president was unwilling or unable to recognize his own inability.46 Bayh
realized that the Kennedy assassination provided the ideal context to act
substantively, that action, not more study, was the primary need, and that
punting the most challenging questions to the future would squander the
interest in the topic created by Kennedy’s assassination. And as a former
Indiana state legislator, Bayh realized that state legislatures would be
unlikely to ratify a proposed constitutional amendment that essentially gave
Congress a blank legislative check, an approach with profound federalism
and separation of powers implications.47 Accordingly, he opposed it
effectively during committee discussions a couple of weeks after Kennedy’s
assassination.
39. BAYH, supra note 25, at 29. The chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Senator James Eastland, a Mississippi Democrat, had planned to close the subcommittee after
the death of its prior chair, Senator Estes Kefauver, but acceded to Bayh’s request that Bayh
be allowed to chair it. Id. at 28–29.
40. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1144.
41. See Presidential Inability: Hearings on S.J. Res. 28, S.J. Res. 35, and S.J. Res. 84
Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amends. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 5–6
(1963).
42. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1143–44.
43. See id. at 1146.
44. Id.
45. BAYH, supra note 25, at 34.
46. Id. at 34–35.
47. Id. at 35.
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Instead, Bayh embarked on a different course and conceived an approach
that became the basis of the eventual Twenty-Fifth Amendment.48 Bayh’s
original Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”) evolved during the
eighty-eighth Congress into Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”) in the
eighty-ninth Congress and ultimately into the form Congress proposed and
the states ratified as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.49 His proposal
comprehensively addressed the major problems involved with presidential
succession and inability and vice presidential vacancy.50 It provided for the
temporary, not permanent, transfer of presidential powers and duties to the
vice president when a president was disabled, even though if the president
died, resigned, or was removed, the vice president would become president
for the duration of the term.51 Bayh’s approach also provided a means to
transfer presidential power and duties from a disabled president by the
president himself or by others in the executive branch if the president was
unwilling or unable to do so, subject to congressional oversight.52 Finally,
Bayh proposed a means for filling a vice presidential vacancy,53 a situation
that had existed following presidential or vice presidential deaths—or, in one
case, a vice presidential resignation—during more than 20 percent of
American history.54 The proposed amendment passed the House by a twothirds vote on June 30, 1965,55 and by a 68 to 5 vote in the Senate on July 6,
1965,56 and was ratified by three-fourths of the states by February 10, 1967.57
This summation of basic facts cannot begin to capture Bayh’s political and
legislative leadership and the labor that converted ideas into constitutional
law. That story, which was written day by day for several years, does not
lend itself to a quick retelling since much of its power is in the details, the
hundreds of small acts and gestures that helped convert an idea into a
constitutional amendment. But even the following, much-abridged version
provides some sense of the range of talents that Bayh displayed as he devoted
himself to improving on the work of George Washington, James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, and others from the founding generation.
Right after Bayh introduced S.J. Res. 139 on December 12, 1963, he paid
courtesy calls to Speaker of the House John McCormack and Senate
President Pro Tempore Carl Hayden.58 McCormack and Hayden followed
Johnson in the line of succession, and the widespread perception that neither
was presidential timber complicated the effort to create a means of filling a
vice presidential vacancy.59 Many legislators viewed that idea as an adverse
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Goldstein, supra note 24, at 967–68.
See id.
Id. at 968–69.
FEERICK, supra note 30, at 258.
111 CONG. REC. 15,216 (1965).
Id. at 15,596.
FEERICK, supra note 7, at 105.
BAYH, supra note 25, at 38–42.
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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reflection on McCormack, and his allies, especially those in the House, were
unwilling to consider a constitutional amendment until a new vice president
was inaugurated in 1965. Bayh visited McCormack and Hayden to
communicate his regard for them and to assure them that his proposal was
not directed at them.60 He also discussed his proposals with key Democratic
senators like Majority Leader Michael Mansfield, Majority Whip Hubert H.
Knowing that a constitutional
Humphrey, and Richard Russell.61
amendment would require Republican support, Bayh also reached out to
Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen.62
Bayh discussed his proposal with President Johnson63 and Johnson aides
whom Bayh knew, such as Larry O’Brien and Lee White,64 during the spring
of 1964. He did not press the new president for open support, knowing that
Johnson would not wish to become involved until after a new vice president
was elected to avoid offending McCormack.65
In addition to reaching out to key Senate leaders, Bayh recognized that the
success of his proposal would depend on winning support from important
groups and individuals outside of Congress. The ABA, which had endorsed
S.J. Res. 35, had convened a blue-ribbon group in Washington, D.C., to
consider the subject on January 20 and 21, 1964.66 Bayh addressed and met
with the group,67 as did some other legislators.68 Bayh made a persuasive
case for S.J. Res. 13969 and the ABA group issued a statement of principles
that, despite some differences, generally coincided with Bayh’s proposal
instead of with S.J. Res. 35.70 So began an ongoing relationship with ABA
leaders and professionals that proved critical to advancing the project.71
During the next two years, Bayh’s deepening ABA ties produced expert
witnesses, a vehicle for legislative outreach, a convener of meetings with
counterparts in the House of Representatives, and a nationwide network that
communicated with members of Congress and state legislators.
With the vice presidency vacant, McCormack next in the line of
succession, and widespread doubts that he was up to being a heartbeat away
from the presidency (especially since President Johnson had himself had a
60. BAYH, supra note 25, at 38–41.
61. Id. at 38–39, 42, 45.
62. Id. at 105–07.
63. Id. at 94–95; Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan with Birch Bayh, U.S. Senator from
Ind. (Feb. 12, 1969), http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/
bayh_b/Bayh.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z9NP-Q7ST] [hereinafter Mulhollan Interview].
64. BAYH, supra note 25, at 92–93.
65. Id. at 92–95; Interview, supra note 34, at 793–94; Mulhollan Interview, supra note
63.
66. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A Personal Remembrance, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1078–79 (2017); see also BAYH, supra note 25, at 45–50.
67. BAYH, supra note 25, at 45–48.
68. Id. at 45, 48–49.
69. Feerick, supra note 66, at 1080–81.
70. Id. at 1079–81.
71. See BAYH, supra note 25, at 49–50; see also JOHN D. FEERICK, THAT FURTHER SHORE:
A MEMOIR OF IRISH ROOTS AND AMERICAN PROMISE 242–66 (2020) (describing some of the
ABA’s activities supporting the amendment).
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serious heart attack), it was clear that the House of Representatives would
not act during the eighty-eighth Congress out of respect for its Speaker and
its institution. The realization that the House would not act in 1964 did not
cause Bayh to regard further effort during that Congress as wasted effort.
Instead, he aggressively forged ahead, recognizing that headway in the
Senate would pay dividends in the future.
Bayh held hearings on the various proposals before the Senate over six of
the first sixty-five days of 1964.72 Bayh strenuously rejected any suggestion
that McCormack was unfit73 and encouraged others to express their
admiration for him.74 The best way to assure presidential continuity was to
provide a means to fill a vice presidential vacancy, he said, and he also
advocated the need to establish procedures to transfer power from a disabled
president and to provide that the president could resume power when the
inability ended.75 Bayh argued that a constitutional amendment was needed
to solve the problem.76
Bayh initially heard from senators who had offered eight different
proposals in January 1964.77 North Carolina Democratic Senator Sam Ervin
proposed that a joint session of Congress elect a new vice president within
ten days of any vacancy in that office.78 New York Republican Senator
Kenneth Keating favored an amendment that would make clear that in case
of presidential inability, the powers and duties of the presidency—but not the
office—passed to the vice president while the inability lasted and empowered
Congress to provide for a double vacancy.79 Keating separately proposed
replacing the single vice presidency with an executive vice president and a
legislative vice president who would split the duties of the existing office and
both be in the line of succession.80 Oklahoma Democratic Senator Mike
Monroney proposed establishing a bipartisan commission to study
presidential inability.81 New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits offered
Senate Joint Resolution 138 (“S.J. Res. 138”), which was similar to Senator
Ervin’s plan but provided that the election be made with the “advice and
consent” of the president.82 On presidential inability, Javits would
essentially adopt Bayh’s proposal but would amend it to allow Congress to
72. See generally 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29.
73. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.)
(“There can be little doubt as to his capability.”).
74. Id. at 63–64 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const.
Amends., and Sen. Frank E. Moss).
75. Id. at 1–5 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const.
Amends.).
76. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. On Const. Amends.).
77. Id. at 7–16.
78. Id. at 18–19 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary);
see also id. at 15.
79. Id. at 24 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, Member, S. Subcomm. on Const.
Amends.); see also id. at 16.
80. Id. at 26–27 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, Member, S. Subcomm. on Const.
Amends.); see also id. at 13–15.
81. Id. at 30, 34–37 (statement of Sen. Mike A. S. Monroney).
82. Id. at 53 (statement of Sen. Jacob J. Javits); see also id. at 11.
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empower some other body to act with the vice president in declaring a
president disabled,83 thereby adopting a feature of the principles outlined by
an ABA conference.84 Senators Frank Moss85 and Edward Long86 expressed
support for S.J. Res. 139, while Senator Roman Hruska favored Senate Joint
Resolution 84 (“S.J. Res. 84”), which resembled Keating’s S.J. Res. 35
except it required Congress to respect separation of powers principles in
legislating on disability procedures.87 Senator Frank Church proposed that a
vice presidential vacancy be filled by the president who, with the Senate’s
advice and consent, would nominate between two and five prospective vice
presidents, from which the House would elect one.88 Professor James
MacGregor Burns was among those who favored establishing a presidential
inability commission that, in his proposal, would consist of an interbranch
commission, which would consult medical experts in deciding if the
president had a temporary or permanent disability.89 Burns thought the vice
president was “the worst person to decide Presidential inability”90 and
opposed giving Congress a role.91
From an early point, Bayh signaled his interest in reaching an agreement.
For instance, noting the ABA’s ability to reach consensus in its January
deliberations, he asked Javits on January 23, 1964, for suggestions on how
Congress might do the same.92 Javits suggested that Bayh conduct informal
meetings with senators to that end.93
Bayh understood that success in the legislative arena also depended on
actions that occurred outside of Capitol Hill. After hearing from senators for
two days in January, he adjourned his hearings for a month until after the
ABA House of Delegates had considered the recommendation of the ABA’s
blue-ribbon commission, whose principles largely tracked the format of S.J.
Res. 139. On February 17, 1964, Bayh traveled to Chicago to speak to the
gathering94 and it unanimously endorsed the consensus principles,95 which
closely tracked S.J. Res. 139. Upon reconvening in late February, then ABA
President Walter Craig and President-Elect Lewis Powell testified regarding

83. Id. at 54 (statement of Sen. Jacob J. Javits).
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id. at 59 (statement of Sen. Frank E. Moss).
86. Id. at 68 (statement of Sen. Edward V. Long, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
87. Id. at 70–71, 74–75 (statement of Sen. Roman L. Hruska, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary); see also id. at 10–11.
88. Id. at 79–80 (statement of Sen. Frank Church).
89. Id. at 113, 115–16 (statement of James MacGregor Burns, Chairman, Political Science
Department, Williams College).
90. Id. at 115 (statement of James MacGregor Burns, Chairman, Political Science
Department, Williams College).
91. Id. at 120 (statement of James MacGregor Burns, Chairman, Political Science
Department, Williams College).
92. Id. at 56 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
93. Id. at 56–57 (statement of Sen. Jacob J. Javits).
94. BAYH, supra note 25, at 62–63.
95. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 85–90 (statement of Walter Craig, President,
American Bar Association).
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the ABA consensus.96 The ABA’s support lent momentum to Bayh’s
proposal, notwithstanding the testimony of a witness for the New York Bar
Association who supported S.J. Res. 35.97 The following day, Eisenhower’s
first attorney general, Herbert Brownell,98 and Harvard’s iconic law
professor, Paul A. Freund,99 both supported the ABA approach that they had
helped formulate, thereby drowning out Burns’s advocacy for a disability
commission. Bayh’s committee also heard from a range of scholarsa
young lawyer, John D. Feerick,100 who had participated in the ABA blueribbon commission and was en route to becoming the nation’s leading expert
on the subject; Ruth Silva,101 who generally favored S.J. Res. 139; and
presidential scholars Richard Neustadt,102 Clinton Rossiter,103 and Sidney
Hyman,104 who tended to favor less formal arrangements.
Bayh also understood the importance of educating the public and
mobilizing popular support. In addition to courting backing from Johnson
and the ABA and communicating his views through national media,105 he
focused attention on two other nationally prominent figures—Eisenhower
and Nixon. Eisenhower provided a letter generally supportive of Bayh’s
position with one exception. It provided that, in the highly unlikely event of
a difference of opinion between the president and vice president regarding a
once disabled president’s fitness to resume the powers and duties of the
presidency, an interbranch disability commission with medical expertise
should decide the matter.106 Nixon’s high profile and lengthy testimony
concluded Bayh’s hearings.107 Although Nixon had authored an article
proposing that the Electoral College be reconvened to consider a presidential
nomination of a new vice president to fill a vacancy in the second office,108
during his testimony he expressed support either for that idea or for Bayh’s
proposal,109 as well as the presidential inability provisions of S.J. Res. 139.110
96. See id. at 84, 91–104 (statement of Lewis F. Powell Jr., President-Elect, American Bar
Association).
97. See id. at 106–09 (statement of Martin Taylor, Chairman, Committee on
Constitutional Law, New York Bar Association).
98. Id. at 134–42 (statement of Herbert Brownell, President, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York).
99. Id. at 128–34 (statement of Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law, Harvard University).
100. Id. at 149–60 (statement of John D. Feerick).
101. Id. at 160–65 (statement of Ruth C. Silva, Professor, Pennsylvania State University).
102. Id. at 166–77 (statement of Richard Neustadt, Professor, Columbia University).
103. Id. at 214–31 (statement of Clinton Rossiter, Professor of American Institutions,
Cornell University).
104. Id. at 179–87 (statement of Sidney Hyman).
105. BAYH, supra note 25, at 96–98.
106. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 232–33.
107. See generally id. at 234–50 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, Former Vice President
of the United States).
108. See generally Richard M. Nixon, We Need a Vice President Now, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, Jan. 1, 1964 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
109. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 239–40, 245–46, 249–50 (statement of
Richard M. Nixon, Former Vice President of the United States).
110. Id. at 241–43, 248 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, Former Vice President of the
United States).

62

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Nixon, like Bayh, emphasized the importance of achieving a solution, not
any particular remedy.111
The National Forum on Presidential Inability, which the ABA convened
in Washington, D.C., on May 25, 1964,112 provided another opportunity to
educate the public on this pressing national problem. Bayh, along with
Brownell and Edward L. Wright, the chair of the ABA House of Delegates,
joined House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler on a panel.113
Eisenhower gave the keynote address but prior to it, at Bayh’s initiative,
Brownell and Bayh successfully lobbied Eisenhower not to repeat the
suggestion of an interbranch and medical commission to resolve an
intraexecutive branch dispute.114 Bayh was always prepared to seize an
opportunity to advance the cause.
Bayh devoted time during the spring and summer months of 1964 to
getting S.J. Res. 139 through his subcommittee and the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. He accepted proposals for minor change from Senator
Ervin,115 added fellow Democratic subcommittee member Tom Dodd as a
cosponsor,116 and worked closely with Senators Keating and Hiram Fong to
agree to report S.J. Res. 139 to the full committee.117 There, he successfully
resisted an effort to report both S.J. Res. 139 and Keating’s measure to the
floor, arguing that doing so would repeat the unhappy patterns of the past in
which the inability to reach agreement had precluded any action.118 Bayh’s
passion prevailed and the committee reported S.J. Res. 139 to the floor with
the understanding that members reserved the right to propose
amendments.119
Bayh astutely recognized that his committee colleagues had acquiesced in
part because they recognized that the House’s inaction meant that any Senate
proposal would die on the floor.120 They thought they had given little in
deferring to Bayh’s argument. They underestimated Birch Bayh. His
realization that Congress would not act did not diminish Bayh’s belief that
the Senate should forge ahead. Bayh continued to collect influential
cosponsors, like Ervin and Javits,121 and pressed Senate Majority Leader
Mansfield to bring the measure to the floor.122
When Mansfield pointed out that the eighty-eighth Congress would not
propose an amendment, Bayh nevertheless insisted that action that session in
the Senate would allow the measure to move quickly in the upper chamber
111. Id. at 234–35 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, Former Vice President of the United
States).
112. BAYH, supra note 25, at 111.
113. Id. at 112–18.
114. Id. at 119–23.
115. See, e.g., id. at 102.
116. Id. at 105.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 131–32.
119. Id. at 132.
120. Id. at 133–34.
121. Id. at 135–36.
122. Id. at 138.
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during the next Congress and focus attention on the House.123 Accordingly,
Mansfield scheduled debate on September 28, 1964, but with only a few
hours of advance notice to Bayh.124 Bayh had promised Keating and Hruska
that they could offer amendments on the floor, but both were out of town on
the day Mansfield scheduled the measure without notice. When Bayh called
them about the situation, they waived Bayh’s agreement and allowed him to
proceed.125 Much of the Senate’s discussion that day focused on the
importance of the vice presidency and the new method to fill a vice
presidential vacancy.126 That theme resonated during the presidential
campaign when comparing the Democratic candidate, Senator Hubert
Humphrey, who was one of the century’s most effective legislators, and his
opponent, Representative William Miller, who had been chosen largely due
to his skill as a political combatant. Following the debate, the Senate passed
the proposed constitutional measure by voice vote with few senators on the
floor.127
The following day, Senator John Stennis objected to the procedure used to
pass S.J. Res. 139.128 Although Bayh initially feared Stennis was hostile to
the measure and sought to undermine Bayh’s work, Stennis was acting based
on the principled belief that the Senate should not propose a constitutional
amendment based on a voice vote.129 Bayh quickly appreciated the
advantages of a roll call vote.130 After brief debate, the Senate voted again,
65 to 0, in favor of Bayh’s measure.131
That overwhelming vote was a tribute to Bayh and the action had two
critical legislative consequences. First, it placed more than two-thirds of the
Senate on record in support of Bayh’s basic approach. That development
eased Bayh’s burden in winning support for the measure the next session.
Indeed, more than two-thirds of the Senate cosponsored S.J. Res. 1, the
successor to S.J. Res. 139.132 The 1964 vote also gave Bayh leverage in
suggesting to the House that S.J. Res. 139 should form the basis for the
proposed amendment.
It was uncertain whether the Senate and House would proceed in tandem.
Celler had labored on the subject in the mid-1950s as chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee while Bayh was a new member of the Indiana House of
Representatives andespecially in such situationssenior House chairmen
are not accustomed to deferring to novice senators. At a strategy meeting

123. Id.
124. Id. at 138–39.
125. Id. at 140.
126. See 110 CONG. REC. 22,982–23,002 (1964).
127. See id. at 23,001–02; see also BAYH, supra note 25, at 156.
128. 110 CONG. REC. 23,019–20.
129. Id. at 23,019–20, 23,056–57 (statement of Sen. John Stennis); see also BAYH, supra
note 25, at 157–58.
130. BAYH, supra note 25, at 157–58.
131. 110 CONG. REC. 23,061. In addition, some twenty additional absent senators also
supported the measure. Id. at 23,060–61.
132. BAYH, supra note 25, at 365.
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with ABA officials, it was decided that Brownell,133 the former attorney
general and luminary from New York who had testified before Celler’s
committee in 1957134 and was a key part of the ABA consensus, would
approach Celler and ask him to introduce as House of Representatives Joint
Resolution 1 (“H.R.J. Res. 1”) a measure identical to Bayh’s Senate
proposal.135 Celler agreed and 1965 began with essentially identical
proposals in the two chambers, based on Bayh’s approach from the prior
Congress.136
With a vice president elected, Bayh ramped up his efforts to secure White
House support for his plan. He worked closely with White House aides, like
Bill Moyers, Ramsey Clark, and McGeorge Bundy, and spoke with Johnson
and Acting Attorney General Katzenbach in December 1964 and January
1965.137 Bayh’s White House feelers produced a favorable mention from
Johnson in his 1965 State of the Union address138 and a presidential message
on the subject139 consistent with Bayh’s measure. Senate momentum
enabled the Senate to proceed first, with short hearings on January 29,
1965,140 a report to the Senate floor early in February,141 and floor passage,
72 to 0, that month.142
This chronology of successes should not create the impression that the
1964 vote put the wind at Bayh’s back, made the legislative sailing smooth,
and made a successful outcome certain. It did not. Challenges remained
along the way. Dirksen,143 Hruska,144 and some other Republicans preferred
Keating’s simpler approach, which authorized Congress to act in the future.
Ervin, who was not feeling well, was in North Carolina when the Senate
planned to consider the measure, but he drove to Washington, D.C., to help
Bayh.145 With help from Ervin and Republican Leverett Saltonstall, Bayh
Dirksen,147 Hruska, and other
defeated the Dirksen substitute.146
Republicans then supported S.J. Res. 1. The Senate also rejected Senator
133. Id. at 162–63.
134. Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Study of Presidential
Inability of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 31 (1957) (statement of Herbert
Brownell Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States).
135. BAYH, supra note 25, at 162.
136. Id. at 162–63.
137. Id. at 163–67; Mulhollan Interview, supra note 63.
138. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 8 (Jan.
4, 1965) (“Even the best of government is subject to the worst of hazards. I will propose laws
to insure the necessary continuity of leadership should the President become disabled or die.”).
139. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1
PUB. PAPERS 100 (Jan. 28, 1965).
140. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 1 (1965).
141. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965).
142. 111 CONG. REC. 3286 (1965).
143. Interview, supra note 34, at 789–90.
144. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 22.
145. BAYH, supra note 25–39, at 245.
146. 111 CONG. REC. 3272.
147. Interview, supra note 34, at 789–90.
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Strom Thurmond’s proposal to empower the Electoral College, not Congress,
to confirm a vice presidential nominee.148 After various Democratic senators
pushed to amend Bayh’s measure to limit Congress’s time to resolve an
intraexecutive branch disability dispute, Bayh was on the verge of accepting
their suggestion.149 Ervin and Hruska successfully implored him to stand his
ground.150 They recognized that such a change was unnecessary because
Bayh had the necessary votes, whereas the change would cost the proposal
some support and would likely result in returning the measure to committee
where it would probably die.151 Bayh held his ground and his proposal
passed 72 to 0.152
Bayh also needed to defend the measure before the House Judiciary
Committee. He testified at length on February 9, 1965, responding to
numerous questions from an engaged committee.153
The amended version of H.R.J. Res. 1 that the House passed on April 13,
1965,154 differed in several material respects from the Senate measure. It
gave the vice president and cabinet two, rather than seven, days to respond
to a disabled president’s declaration of his fitness155 and provided that
Congress would decide an intraexecutive branch dispute within ten days,
rather than “immediately.”156 Bayh was chosen to head the Senate’s
delegation to the conference committee, which consisted of Senators
Dirksen, Ervin, Hruska, and James Eastland.157 Although the other
variations lent themselves to simple compromises, resolving the ten-day
decision versus immediate decision difference presented difficulties,
especially for Southern and conservative senators who adamantly resisted
any effort to impose time limits on the Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate.
Ultimately, the conference agreed to the compromises Bayh suggested.158
The final issuean agreement that the House and Senate would resolve a
dispute between the president and vice president over the former’s inability
within twenty-one dayswas most complicated. Several meetings and the
intervention of ABA President Lewis Powell were required before the House,
especially Representative William McCulloch, agreed to a period in excess
of ten days.159
When the Senate considered the conference report, Senators Albert Gore
and Eugene McCarthy questioned some language that was added to the
148. 111 CONG. REC. 3274.
149. Id. at 3275–80; see also BAYH, supra note 25, at 265.
150. BAYH, supra note 25, at 265.
151. Id. at 265–69.
152. 111 CONG. REC. 3281, 3286.
153. Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 39–70, 77–95 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
154. 111 CONG. REC. 7968–69.
155. BAYH, supra note 25, at 282–85.
156. FEERICK, supra note 7, at 100.
157. BAYH, supra note 25, at 280.
158. See id. at 292–95, 303–04; Feerick, supra note 66, at 1075, 1097–1100 (providing
further details regarding the conference).
159. See BAYH, supra note 25, at 301–03.
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amendment during the conference at the request of Senator Hruska.160 They
thought the language made it ambiguous whether Congress could create an
“other body” under section 4 that would provide an alternative co–decision
maker along with the vice president or would replace the cabinet when
deciding if the president was able or unable to serve.161 Bayh insisted that
such “other body” would replace the cabinet as the group to act with the vice
president.162 The debate forced a postponement until July 6, 1965, when the
Senate joined the House in approving the proposed amendment before
sending it to the states.163
III. THE ESSENCE OF BAYH’S LEADERSHIP
The preceding overview suggests that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was
not inevitable. Of course, Eisenhower’s inabilities and the nightmare in
Dallas, superimposed on the Cold War and nuclear age, established a context
that encouraged action.164 Yet, the range of alternative approaches, the
competing philosophies, the high barriers against constitutional amendments,
and the inherent inertia of the systemespecially regarding issues like
presidential continuityintroduced daunting obstacles. Those formidble
hurdles needed to be overcome, and they were by the skillful and determined
political leadership of Birch Bayh. The nature of Bayh’s accomplishment
becomes more apparent if we shift the focus from the chronology of events
to the leadership qualities he brought to the table.
To begin with, Bayh demonstrated what might be called high legislative
ethics. Whereas many legislators are content to give a speech, cast a vote, or
introduce legislation without performing the heavy work to secure
enactment, Bayh was different. He was not interested in making speeches or
taking positions to curry favor. He wanted to help solve vexing problems
that had lingered since the nation’s infancy and that posed more ominous
risks in a world made smaller by technology. His steadfast focus was on
achieving concrete legal reforms to better ensure presidential continuity. He
wanted to provide a means to fill a vice presidential vacancy without having
to wait for the next regularly scheduled election and to create procedures to
transfer presidential powers and duties from a disabled president while
allowing the president to resume those powers and duties upon recovery.
Bayh wanted to address the problem. Bayh’s commitment to problemsolving was all the more admirable because the issue was complex, required
an enormous time commitment, and offered no political payoff. Voters
would not reward a legislator who devoted himself to presidential continuity,
an issue of contingent significance that had a remote impact on any
constituent’s or group’s well-being. That was not the way to curry favor or
build a campaign war chest. Political expediency seemed to counsel focusing
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

111 CONG. REC. 15,381–87 (1965).
See id.
Id. at 15,382–84 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
Id. at 15,596.
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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on bread-and-butter issues that translated more directly into people’s lives.
Yet, Bayh went to Washington to do good. He took an oath to support the
Constitution and, to Bayh, those commitments compelled him to devote
himself to improving America’s system of presidential continuity.
In order to improve America’s system of ensuring presidential continuity,
Bayh needed to have a deep intellectual understanding of the specific
problems of presidential succession and inability within the larger context of
American government and politics. Bayh’s constitutional vision led him to
conclude that the presidency needed to be filled at all times with a functioning
and legitimate chief executive. The vice presidency provided the best means
of addressing presidential succession and presidential inability. A vice
president would be most effective and legitimate as a successor if he were
personally and politically compatible with the president but also had some
democratic pedigree. Furthermore, a system of presidential inability needed
to protect the nation from a disabled president, protect the president from
having his power usurped, and encourage decision makers to act when
appropriate. Bayh designed S.J. Res. 1 to accommodate that vision with all
of its complexity and tensions.
Bayh mastered the issue of presidential succession and inability. He
learned from the hearings, where he engaged with practitioners and
scholars.165 As he did, his understanding of the subject and mastery of the
arguments increased. He could respond ably to hypotheticals and provide
reasoned arguments based on history and his knowledge of political and
constitutional institutions to satisfy colleagues. His understanding of the
subject was evident and enhanced his credibility with other legislators and
participants in the reform effort.
Although an intellectual understanding of the subject matter was necessary
in leading an effort to close gaps regarding presidential continuity, it was not
sufficient. Bayh also needed to understand the legal, political, and legislative
contexts in which he was operating in order to succeed. He soon realized
many of the reforms he pursued required a constitutional amendment. That
was certainly true regarding the goal of establishing a means to fill the vice
presidency between quadrennial elections and to transfer presidential powers
and duties from a disabled president over his objection, and it was perhaps
true regarding other aspects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as well. The
need to amend the Constitution imposed multiple supermajority
requirements: two-thirds in each house and three-fourths of the states.166
Moreover, the unique quality of a constitutional amendment, and the
difficulty of correcting a mistake, would make legislators hesitant to act.
Bayh understood that these obstacles required certain strategic and tactical
responses. He needed to exploit and build upon the concern President
Kennedy’s assassination had created to find a solution quickly167 rather than
defer the heavy lifting until later, as S.J. Res. 35 would have done. Bayh
165. See supra notes 94–111 and accompanying text.
166. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
167. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1000–01.
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insisted that the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination presented the time for
action, not for more study.168 The issues had been studied extensively. He
argued that the status quo was unacceptable. The opportunity the moment
provided needed to be seized. Even as other major events diverted
attention—Congress’s passage of the tax cut,169 the epic Civil Rights Act of
1964,170 Johnson’s vice presidential selection, the presidential campaign, and
a plane crash that almost took Bayh’s life171—he kept the legislative pedal to
the metal, preserving and developing public opinion on the topic, pushing
S.J. Res. 139 through committee, obtaining time on the Senate’s calendar to
consider the measure, and securing passage of it twice, ultimately by a 65 to
0 vote.172 Once the 1964 election produced a vice president elect and
removed the obstacle to further action in the House, Bayh continued to press
forward by pursuing a strategy most likely to win Celler’s support. Bayh
obtained Johnson’s public backing, testified before the House to defend his
measure, and secured rapid passage in the Senate.173
The multiple supermajority requirements meant that the effort needed to
be bipartisan and Bayh made sure that it was. As he later said, “The TwentyFifth Amendment is a good example of getting the so-called loyal opposition
involved.”174 The pedigree of Bayh’s proposal increased the prospect of the
bipartisan support needed to pass a constitutional amendment. It was, after
all, a modified and expanded version of a proposal the Eisenhower
Eisenhower’s
administration had recommended in 1957 and 1958.175
influential attorney general, Brownell, was likely to be receptive to
approaches that included those he had crafted, as was the even more
influential President Eisenhower who had adopted them. Their support no
doubt reassured many, especially on the Republican side of the aisle. Even
when Senate Minority Leader Dirksen offered an alternative to Bayh’s
approach in February 1965, only eleven Republican senators followed their
leader and a greater number voted for Bayh’s approach.176
Bayh made visible use of Republican luminaries to attract attention to the
effort. Nixon’s testimony was among the highlights of the 1964 hearings and
Brownell offered important support, as did Eisenhower. Bayh reached out to
Dirksen and worked closely with Republican colleagues like Senators
168. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 37–39 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
169. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
170. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
171. Senator Kennedy Hurt in Air Crash; Bayh Injured, Too: Both Are in Fair Condition
in Massachusetts Hospital—Pilot of Plane Killed, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1964),
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/20/archives/senator-kennedy-hurt-in-air-crash-bayhinjured-too-both-are-in-fair.html [https://perma.cc/4W2P-SJPY].
172. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
173. See supra Part II.
174. Interview, supra note 34, at 785.
175. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1149.
176. 111 CONG. REC. 3272 (1965).
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Hruska, Fong, Javits, Saltonstall, and James Pearson who provided important
vocal support for his effort at critical times.177
Bayh understood that the significance and difficulty of correcting
constitutional amendments make legislators most risk averse and,
accordingly, the product had to be familiar and include some flexibility. To
provide these characteristics, Bayh largely incorporated ideas and
approaches that were recognizable and comfortable rather than reinventing
the wheel.178 The means to fill a vice presidential vacancy allowed the
president to nominate and the two bodies of Congress to confirm a new vice
president, an approach that followed the political practice of presidential
nominees designating their running mates who were subject to convention
approval and election. The presidential inability procedures resembled those
the Eisenhower administration had proposed in the late 1950s under the
leadership of Brownell and William Rogers, as well as informal letter
agreements between Eisenhower and Nixon, Kennedy and Johnson, and
Johnson and McCormack.179 Section 4 was a modified version of the
Eisenhower 1958 proposal.180 Bayh’s intuitive understanding of how to
maximize the appeal of his amendment was critical in fashioning a proposal
that could attract support. Bayh recognized that tried and familiar practices
were more likely to win acceptance than blank checks or sweeping
innovations. There was no shame in borrowing such ideas. On the contrary,
had Bayh proposed something entirely new, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
would not have been adopted and we would probably still be trying to solve
some of the problems the amendment successfully addressed. By
reconfiguring familiar ideas, Bayh exploited the comfort many had with
them.
Although Bayh’s constitutional, legislative, and political understanding
and vision were important, they would not have produced the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment without his political skill in managing the legislative process.
He did not simply understand legislative politics. He knew how to practice
them. He was simply a good politician. He demonstrated his know-how in
so many ways. He acted to neutralize powerful potential adversaries. He
paid McCormack and Hayden early calls to assure them that his proposal was
not targeted at them.181 He went out of his way to praise them in order to
negate any public comments that implied they were unfit.182 He also dropped
from his initial proposal a provision that would have run the line of
succession through the cabinet, not congressional leaders, to mitigate the
concern that the proposal was a negative reflection on those experienced
legislators.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra notes 145–51 and accompanying text.
Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1001–03.
See supra Part I.
See U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4.
See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
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He adopted an inclusive approach. He invited colleagues to contribute to
perfecting the proposed amendment and many—Ervin, Hruska, Javits,
Dirksen, and others—did. Bayh credited their contributions. Ervin, for
instance, suggested that instead of using “cabinet” in his proposal, a word the
Constitution did not contain, Bayh should use the constitutional formulation
“heads of the executive departments.”183 Bayh gladly adopted the
suggestion, recognizing that the change gave Ervin a feeling of ownership
over the amendment.184 Bayh was disposed to focusing on areas where he
and his colleagues agreed rather than emphasizing their divergences, and he
used that skill to narrow differences and promote a collegial environment and
a sense of a shared undertaking. When Ervin proposed an amendment on
January 22, 1964, that would have allowed a joint session of Congress to
elect a new vice president at hearings, Bayh emphasized that “we have a great
deal of common agreement.”185 Both thought current arrangements were
inadequate and wanted to give the people’s representatives a role, so Bayh
asked for “the benefit of [Ervin’s] wisdom” regarding any objections to
allowing the president to suggest a nominee for Congress to consider.186
Ervin averred that he did not have “too serious [an] objection to that”
approach.187 A few months later, Ervin agreed to cosponsor S.J. Res. 139188
and became a valuable ally. The next day Bayh commented on the
“substantial agreement”189 between his approach and Javits’s, which called
for Congress to elect a vice president with the advice and consent of the
president. Bayh promised to consider Javits’s approach and observed that
“we both share a deep concern that we get action,”190 a subtle observation on
the importance of adopting a solution, considering that many possibilities
would have improved on the status quo. Javits approached Bayh about
becoming a cosponsor of S.J. Res. 139 the same week Ervin did.191
Bayh understood that success depended on compromise.192 He shared the
impulse that Feerick articulated regarding the importance of emphasizing
areas of agreement and building from those rather than insisting on a
particular formulation.193 Bayh’s original proposal did not include a
provision that allowed Congress to replace the cabinet, as a section 4 decision
maker to act with the vice president, with “such other body” as it created.194

183. BAYH, supra note 25, at 102.
184. Id.
185. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 20–21 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
186. Id. (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
187. Id. at 21 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
188. BAYH, supra note 25, at 136.
189. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 55 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman,
S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
190. Id. at 56 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
191. BAYH, supra note 25, at 135–36.
192. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1003–06.
193. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 150 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman,
S. Subcomm. on Const. Amends.).
194. U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4.
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That concept came from the ABA consensus principles195 and probably made
the amendment more attractive to those wary of a system that lodged all
responsibility for the decision in the executive branch. Bayh was good at
identifying the basis of accommodation between the Senate and House
measures. He dropped the effort to replace legislative succession with a
cabinet line because he recognized that such an effort would offend some
legislators, especially in the House, while offering little return. Although
most of the issues between the House and the Senate were easily resolved,
the biggest sticking point was in the difference between the House bill, which
required that a dispute between the president, vice president, and cabinet over
the president’s ability to return to office be resolved within ten days, and the
Senate measure, which did not impose a time limit but provided that
Congress would “immediately proceed to decide the issue.”196 Bayh
recognized the sensitivities of the issue, especially for Southern and
conservative senators who resisted the idea of limits on debate. Bayh’s
fellow conferees from the SenateDemocrats Eastland and Ervin and
Republicans Dirksen and Hruskawere not receptive to a firm timetable.
Bayh expressed sympathy with their position, which no doubt enhanced his
credibility with them, but he suggested a twenty-one-day time limit to decide
whether the president was disabled or not.197
The twenty-one-day compromise was more than twice as long as the ten
days the House had proposed.
It thus represented a significant
accommodation of the Senate, especially since limiting the time to decide
who could discharge presidential powers and duties could be distinguished
from other matters. It was palatable to the House because it could always
return the president to power more quickly by deciding the issue in
substantially less time. Once either chamber concluded that the president
was not disabled, he resumed the powers and duties of his office.
Bayh’s personal traits also enhanced the leadership that was crucial to the
success of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Bayh was humble enough to
understand that he needed help from more experienced and esteemed
senators as well as public servants. He developed relationships with older,
more seasoned leaders and he deployed them to advance the cause. Bayh
cultivated Johnson, Dirksen, Ervin, and others.198 He did not hesitate to ask
Brownell to caution Eisenhower regarding the perils of a medical
commission199 or to approach Celler to persuade him to adopt the Senate
proposal as H.R.J. Res. 1.200 He enlisted Powell to approach Celler when
negotiations between the House and Senate conferees reached an impasse.201
Bayh did much of the heavy lifting and did not shy away from defending the
proposed amendment. Yet he recognized that sometimes more senior, well195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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respected colleagues and voices would carry influence, and he did not resist
sharing the spotlight. He wanted to achieve results, not command attention.
Bayh’s likability also helped make him the effective leader that he was.
Bayh recalled learning at an early age “to treat other people the way you’d
like to be treated yourself”202 and he viewed that principle as a basic precept
of legislative life.203 Bayh was liked by his colleagues and other politicians.
Because they liked him, they were willing to help on an endeavor that was
important to him and constructive for the country. Instead of closing the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments as he had intended,
Senator Eastland responded favorably to Bayh’s request that he chair the
body.204 After Senator Stennis rebelled at the idea of the Senate proposing a
constitutional amendment by voice vote, he worked with Bayh to put most
of their colleagues on record supporting Bayh’s proposal.205 When the
Senate was about to debate Bayh’s proposal in February 1965, Ervin, though
not feeling well, abandoned a planned rest on short notice to drive back to
Washington, D.C., from North Carolina to assist Bayh.206 When Dirksen and
Hruska failed to advance their preferred approaches, they rallied behind
Bayh’s. When some Senate colleagues criticized aspects of Bayh’s proposal,
Senate heavyweights like Ervin, Dirksen, Hart, Javits, and John Sherman
Cooper rallied to his aid.207 Bayh’s colleagues wanted him to succeed.
Bayh’s likeability was certainly not the only reason his colleagues followed
his lead on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, but it certainly helped.
Bayh was persistent. He began to study presidential continuity shortly
after Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. His laser focus on the
subject continued until the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified on
February 10, 1967. Even an airplane crash in July 1964, which almost took
his life, did not deter Bayh from his legislative role. Even as new obstacles
appeared, Bayh maintained his commitment to seeing the job to its finish.
In fact, the accomplishment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not end
his involvement with the issue. In the mid-1970s, he led the Senate through
the first application of section 2 to fill the vice presidential vacancies when
Spiro Agnew resigned and when Gerald R. Ford became president.208 He
held hearings in 1975 when colleagues raised proposals ranging from using
section 2 to choose all vice presidents to replacing it with a system of special
elections.209 After he left the Senate, he cochaired, along with Brownell, the
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National Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, sponsored by the University of Virginia’s Miller Center.210
In the mid-1990s, I served with Bayh on the Working Group on Disability
in U.S. Presidents, established at Wake Forest University by the
distinguished Woodrow Wilson scholar, Professor Arthur Link, and a
number of medical professionals who were interested in the issue of
presidential health and initially critical of—indeed hostile to—the
amendment. Bayh listened patiently to their objections without becoming
defensive. He responded in a friendly and thoughtful manner. During the
course of several meetings, Bayh patiently explained the process by which
the amendment had been adopted, the complicated concerns it had sought to
balance, and the reasons for the choices made. I watched as Bayh’s
explanations converted many of these thoughtful and concerned people from
critics of the amendment to champions of it.211 In 2010, Bayh participated
in a Fordham Law Review symposium on presidential continuity.212 As a
senator and public citizen, Bayh maintained his commitment to exploring
ways to better ensure presidential continuity and educating others about the
problems.
To be sure, Bayh was not solely responsible for the adoption of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, nor did he handle it without mistakes. Of course,
perfection is never the test for great leadership, and human beings who
assume difficult leadership roles (and even those who do not) inevitably
make mistakes. Bayh’s mistakes were few and far between, but he learned
from them, corrected them, and moved ahead, as great leaders do.
It is remarkable that a senator who was as young and junior as Bayh was
in the mid-1960s was the amendment’s architect and builder, the person most
responsible for the positive constitutional change the amendment produced.
After all, Bayh could not lead based on the powers inherent in his position in
the Senate, or from his professional reputation in the chamber, or stature and
credibility from prior battles. His leadership tools at this beginning stage of
his time in the Senate were simply his knowledge, judgment, skills, and
personal traits. Nonetheless, Bayh’s gifts enabled him, in his first years in
Congress, to successfully lead an effort to amend the Constitution to address
problems that dated from the early days of the republic.
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was the first significant accomplishment of
Birch Bayh’s three terms in the U.S. Senate. It was an important part,
although only a part, of the considerable substantive legacy of his senatorial
career. His work on the amendment also left a compelling model of
exemplary political leadership. As John Feerick observed:
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The one thing that was present at the time—there was a young Senator from
Indiana by the name of Birch Bayh, who was chairman of a very important
subcommittee and who had a very strong interest in the Constitution and
issues such as succession and direct popular election. I’m not sure, without
that kind of force of one person that galvanized an entire body, some of
these reforms would ever have happened.213

Birch Bayh’s gifted leadership made the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
possible and provides an enduring example of political and legislative
leadership of the highest order.
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